The effects of Iraq on the Scottish economy by Taylor, Richard
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Taylor, Richard (1990) The effects of Iraq on the Scottish economy. 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, 16 (2). pp. 88-90. ISSN 0306-7866 , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/51738/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
Economic Perspective 3 
THE EFFECTS OF IRAQ ON THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY 
by Richard Taylor, 
Deputy Group Economist, Royal Bank of Scotland 
There seems to be something of a consensus around 
that the Scottish economy has been performing 
better than the UK average over the past twelve 
months or so, is still doing so, and may well go 
on doing so for a little while yet. This view is 
reinforced by nearly all the indicators we can lay 
our hands on - total output, manufacturing output, 
employment and unemployment, high street sales, 
property prices. It is of course difficult to 
pick out where exactly we are at the moment, or 
when a turning point is or even if it has been 
reached. Numbers of the available indicators are 
lagging ones, and nearly all of them are 
notoriously out of date. But the weight of 
evidence supports the relative buoyancy view. Our 
own internally-generated information, which may be 
rather more timely, also gives support to this 
view, however. Each month we survey our regions, 
to get a feel for what is happening in each area. 
It has been clear that, for some months now, the 
slowdown has really been biting south of the 
border. Starting in London and the South East, 
and gradually spreading outwards, the reports have 
been of slowdown, downturn and difficulty in many 
sectors. By contrast, Scotland has remained much 
more optimistic. Recently some indications of a 
change in tone can be discerned, but the Scottish 
reports are only now saying what we heard from 
England nine months ago. 
part of the allied forces in Saudi Arabia, 
which would at a minimum restore Kuwaiti 
supplies, and might even change the regime in 
Iraq so that Iraqi supplies came back on 
stream too. 
A prolonged stalemate in situ, waiting until 
economic sanctions finally produced 
concessions from Iraq which would release 
Kuwait. 
Either of the latter two, which unfortunately look 
more likely, have somewhat unfortunate 
consequences for oil prices - "unfortunate" that 
is, from the viewpoint of the developed world. 
The first - successful war - would put at risk 
Saudi supplies. Even if in the end no damage were 
done to them (which seems unlikely), market 
reaction would be to hoist prices. And physical 
damage would be a racing certainty in Kuwait and 
Iraq, keeping their supplies shut in for some 
time. The second would tend, at a minimum, to 
keep prices where they are now for a long time and 
perhaps to push them up from time to time 
depending on market information: how far, or not, 
sanctions are biting; the likelihood of 
hostilities; or whether in the end,the world would 
throw in its hand and leave Saddam Hussein in 
possession. 
Given this, what can we expect as a consequence of 
the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait? First of all, we 
unfortunately need to make some gigantic political 
assumptions. Doug McWilliams at the CBI has 
helpfully sketched out a number of possible 
options. These envisage, inter alia: -
A negotiated withdrawal by Iraq which would 
bring Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil back into world 
markets. This would be the optimal solution 
economically and in other ways, but I have to 
say it seems very unlikely. 
A short and successful, if bloody, war on the 
I would propose, therefore, that we take as our 
starting point an assumption that we can probably 
expect, say, at least a year of "high" oil prices, 
in the $35 to $40 per barrel (pb) range, with the 
possibility of some brief temporary "spikes" well 
above that level in the event of hostilities. The 
longer term implications of the crisis are in my 
view rather different, as will be seen later. 
Meanwhile, in examining the short-term 
consequences of this kind of model, several points 
stand out:-
It wouldn't do to get over-excited about 
these levels of prices. In the first place, 
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it is true that recent price levels, 
averaging say, $35 pb, represent an increase 
of 100% over the immediate pre-invasion price 
of $17.50 pb, and 70% on the January figure. 
But, compared with the two previous oil 
shocks this is still pretty small beer. In 
the space of two weeks in October 1973, 
prices rose 70%, and twelve weeks later they 
rose by a further 131%. In the 1979/80 price 
rise, the increase was 155%, to about the 
same level as at present in nominal terms. 
Secondly, higher volatility in markets is to 
be expected now as compared with the 1970s. 
Effective prices are now influenced much more 
by spot market prices than by long-term 
contracts which in turn are influenced more 
by short-term expectations. Consequently, 
they are subject to acute but reversible 
over-reactions, in similar manner to, for 
example, currency rates. 
Thirdly, if we look at things in real terms, 
adjusted for inflation, recent prices of some 
$35 pb, are still worth only a little over 
60% of the average for the peak year of 1981. 
To equal the 1981 price in real terms would 
require a current price of between $55 pb and 
$60 pb. 
Fourthly, joint Iraqi/Kuwaiti production 
amounted to around 4.5m bpd, before the 
crisis. This is capable in the short-term of 
being largely made up by other OPEC 
producers, (mainly Saudi) and they have 
agreed to raise their daily production. In 
addition, non-OPEC producers have some scope 
for higher output. The British North Sea in 
August had an output level of 1.7m bpd. This 
is likely to fall over the winter due to 
maintenance, repair and safety programmes 
pre-planned, perhaps to 1.4m bpd. But by 
early in 1991, it should have bounced back, 
on our estimates, to around 2.2m bpd, 
producing a net gain of 0.5m bpd. On top of 
all this are strategic stocks around the 
world totalling 3,500m barrels, or more on 
some estimates. 
One is thus led to conclude that the crisis 
is liveable with - the basic supply/demand 
position has not altered disastrously. There 
ought to be a notice above every spot 
dealer's screen reading, in Large, Green, 
Friendly letters, "Don't Panic". 
That said, we can expect what I suppose could 
be called the "Fear Premium" in the price to 
persist until a settlement of whatever kind 
is reached in the Gulf. Hence my earlier 
suggestions of prices persisting in the 
present range. 
So what do we expect for the Scottish economy 
against this background? We need first to 
consider the wider effects on our principal 
markets around the world. Doug McWilliams, 
Economic Adviser to the CBI, has modelled the 
effects of the scenarios outlined above and 
estimated their world economic effects. 
His predictions for effects on world growth and 
inflation on even the worst scenarios are bad, but 
not desperately dramatic, certainly not on the 
scale of what we experienced in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. On the worst possible case, he 
envisages leaving Iraq in the driving seat for the 
whole of the Middle East, and in control of all 
its oil supply. This produces world economic 
stagnation by 1992 and only a sluggish recovery 
thereafter. Unemployment in the west could rise 
from the present 26m to 32m. Inflation would rise 
to an average of 6% for 1991-93 (as against a 
current 4%). 
On a more likely scenario, a lengthy stand-off, 
akin to the one outlined above, world growth slows 
to 1.6% in 1992 from the present 3%, inflation 
rises to 5.5%. All major economies slow down, 
with Japan and Western Europe, the biggest 
importers, doing worst. Even so, world growth 
recovers after 1992. 
A war scenario (assumed very short and successful 
in every way) causes a sharp rise in inflation, to 
7%, and a sharper drop in growth, to slightly 
negative in 1991-92, but both of these are very 
brief, and are followed by a striking recovery, to 
over 5% growth (excellent by historical standards) 
and "normal" inflation of 4% by 1994. 
In the short-run, averaging out these scenarios 
and settling on figures akin to the middle one, 
Scotland of course shares to a good degree the 
fate of the United Kingdom. Here the position is 
mixed. The UK is currently in a weaker position 
than the majority of Western European countries. 
On any scenario, it is going to have to grow much 
more slowly than average over the next couple of 
years. ERM entry only emphasises this. An 
initial rise in inflation caused by oil prices 
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would be taking place from a much higher base than 
in the rest of Europe. The subsequent slowdown in 
domestic growth would start from a lower point 
than in the rest of Europe. 
There are two compensations, however. The first 
relates to government revenues. On a rough rule 
of thumb, the increase to the mid-30s in the 
dollar price of oil since July should be worth 
about an extra £700m or £800m in fiscal year 
1991/92. The second relates to the Current 
Account of the Balance of Payments, where slightly 
larger annual benefits could be expected to 
accrue. 
For Scotland, neither of these two mean very much, 
except insofar as they ease fiscal pressures on 
the UK government and help improve a poor current 
account position. To that extent, they may 
contribute to making interest rates lower than 
they otherwise might have been, and so mitigating 
the severity of the UK economic recession in 
1990/91. 
What seem to me more important are the direct 
effects of the crisis on the Scottish economy. We 
can group these into bad news and good news. The 
bad news is that the crisis will, on a net basis, 
make worse the growth position of the UK as a 
whole next year. There will be some form of 
recession. Scotland has so far been shielded, but 
to the extent that this has been the effects of 
traditional "lags" - from consumption to 
investment, in the housing cycle and so on - this 
is unlikely to continue. Secondly, overseas 
markets in Europe, the USA and Japan are all 
likely to grow more slowly next year, and Scotland 
is still more export-intensive than the UK 
average, according to available survey data. A 
further, specific, piece of bad news needs to be 
added here, in the shape of the trade embargo on 
Kuwait and Iraq. Scottish Council Survey data do 
not suggest that these countries are key markets 
for Scottish exporters. Indeed, they suggest that 
they are marginal. However, CBI telephone 
enquiries conducted after the crisis broke 
suggested that the effect is likely to be bigger 
than the Scottish Council figures suggest. There 
appears to be a considerable number of sub-
contractors to English and German lead producers 
who are already beginning to feel the pinch of 
suspended orders. Unfortunately, this is 
unquantifiable on any meaningful basis. But it is 
reasonable to expect that the better performance 
of the Scottish economy witnessed over the past 
year or so will tend to converge down towards the 
average UK performance. 
The good news relates to the effect of the crisis 
on North Sea exploration, development and 
production activity and associated onshore work. 
The recovery in North Sea activity since 1987 has 
already been having a beneficial effect on the 
entire Scottish economy. It is unlikely that the 
higher oil prices resulting from the Gulf Crisis 
will themselves have much of an immediate effect 
on the North Sea industry over and above present 
plans, except insofar as they persuade producers 
to pump as much as they can from existing wells. 
To make major upgradings in exploration and 
development plans, operators would have to be 
convinced of a higher permanent price post-crisis. 
I think this is not yet the case. 
However, looking further ahead than the present 
crisis and the present price, it seems reasonable 
to speculate on the likelihood of higher 
sustainable level of activity. Having been 
"bitten" three times now by crises arising from 
the fundamental political instability of the 
Middle East, it would be surprising if Western 
governments did not now turn, jointly and 
severally, to consider means of how in the long-
run to marginalise the Middle East as a key source 
of energy. Moves in this direction of course 
would include the whole panoply of energy 
conservation, alternative sources, reconsideration 
of nuclear programmes and so on. But for those 
countries with indigenous oil reserves, 
inducements, probably fiscal, to get more of them 
out of the ground over the next few years should 
probably have a high priority. To that extent, 
special pleading by oil companies and operators to 
the Department of Energy and HM Treasury should 
now fall on more receptive ears. Thus, in the 
short run the Scottish economy is likely to suffer 
along with the rest of the UK in a situation where 
the oil price hike merely turns the screw on an 
existing economic slowdown. However, the medium 
term picture may be more palatable particularly if 
greater government incentive is forthcoming to 
encourage even more intensive exploration, 
development and production from the North Sea. 
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